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Abstract
What is the impact of firms that cross-list, issue  international firms migrates from domestic to
depositary receipts, or raise capital in international stock  international markets and the reduction in domestic
markets on the liquidity of remaini ig firms in domes:ic  liq  uidity of 'nternational firms has negative spillover
markets?  Using a panel  of over 3,200  firmrs from  55  eff:cts  on do nesric  firm liquidity.  Second,  there  is trade
countries during 1989-2000,  Levine and Schmukler find  diversion wit lin domestic markets as liquidity shifts out
that internationalization  reduces th  'liquidity of domestic  of domestic firms and into international firms.
firms  through  two  channels.  First,  the  trading  of
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This  paper  assesses  the  question:  what  is  the  impact  of  firms  that  participate  in
international stock markets on the liquidity of the remaining firms in the domestic stock market?
An extensive literature examines "intemational firms," the firms that participate in international
markets by issuing depositary receipts, cross-listing, or raising new capital (e.g., Alexander, Eun,
and Janakirananan,  1987, 1988; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998, 1999, 2000; Miller, 1999; Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz, 2002; and the review by Karolyi, 1998).  This paper, instead, focuses on the
impact of internationalization on "domestic firms," the firms that do not internationalize.
Theory provides  conflicting predictions  about the impact of internationalization on the
liquidity of domestic firms.  Consider first the "migration and spillover" argument.  According to
the migration view, internationalization will induce a shift in the trading of international firms
out of the domestic market  and into international markets.  This may  occur because  foreign
markets  have  lower  transaction  costs  and  are  more  liquid  (Chowdhry  and  Nanda,  1991).
"Spillovers" means that a drop in the domestic trading of international firms hurts the liquidity of
domestic firms.'  This could occur because of fixed costs associated with operating a market,
running brokerage  firms, clearing and settling transactions, etc.  Thus, a drop in the domestic
trading  of  intemational  stocks  increases  the  per  trade  cost  of  domestic  stock transactions.
Liquidity spillovers could also occur if investors shift their trading to international markets.  For
example, investors may seek to diversify country-specific risk.  Thus, when some firms cross-list
or  issue  depositary  receipts  in  international  markets,  investors  may  attain  country-specific
diversification through these liquid international markets and therefore reduce their trading in
Chordia,  Roll,  and  Subrahmanyam  (2000) argue  that  liquidity  is more  than  an  attribute  of  a single  security.
Individual liquidity tends to co-move with market liquidity.
1domestic markets.2 This involves a shift out of trading domestic stocks on domestic exchanges
and into trading internationalized stocks on international exchanges.  Combined, migration and
spillovers imply that internationalization reduces the domestic liquidity of international firms due
to  migration,  and  the resultant  drop in  aggregate  domestic  liquidity reduces  the  liquidity of
domestic firms due to spillovers.
Some disagree with  the migration  and  liquidity spIlover  view and  instead  argue that
internationalization  improves  domestic  market  liquidity.  In  contrast  to  the migration  view,
Hargis  (2000)  argues  that  cross-listing  can transform  a  segmented  equity  market  with  low
liquidity  into  an  integrated  market  with  high  liquidity.  Similarly,  Alexander,  Eun,  and
Janakiramanan (1987) and Domowitz, Glen, and IvIadhavan (1998) hold that internationalization
may actually stimulate domestic trading of international firmis  due to the increased integration of
markets.  Also, if internationalization increases transparency,  this could increase  the domestic
trading of international firms with positive spillover effects for the rest of the domestic market.
Other  skeptics  of  the  migration  spillover  view  could  question  the  existence  of  liquidity
spillovers, or doubt the economic importance of the impact of aggregate trading on the liquidity
of domestic firms.  Thus, it is an empirical question as to whether internationalization induces
migration and spillovers, or whether intemnationalization  boosts the liquidity of domestic firms.
Second,  consider  the  "domestic  trade  diversion"  view,  which  argues  that
internationalization  induces  a  compositional  shift  in  dornestic  market  trading.  Firms  that
internationalize may  become more attractive to  those trading  in domestic markets  because  of
improvements  in reputation, higher disclosure staLndards,  the availability  of more analysts that
generate  more  information,  and  the  expansion  of  the  shareholder  base  in  the  context  of
2 Ahearne,  Griever, and Warnock (2003) and Edison and  rnamock  (2003) show that U.S. investors focus on firms
that have intemationalized.
2segmented  markets. 3 Thus,  traders  in  the  domestic market  may  shift  their  trading  out  of
domestic firms and into the domestic trading of intemational firms.  All else equal, this domestic
trade diversion implies less trading of domestic firms and greater trading of intemational firms in
the domestic market.  However, some theories conflict with the trade diversion view and instead
argue that intemationalization may enhance integration and thereby boost liquidity of domestic
firms (e.g., Alexander, et al.,  1987; Domowitz, et al.,  1998; Hargis, 2000).  This could occur
because  integration  increases  the  liquidity  of  all  firms  in  the  local  markets.  Moreover,
integration may induce a compositional shift in domestic market liquidity toward domestic firms
as  the  trading  of  intemational  firms  migrates  abroad.  Again,  theory  provides  conflicting
predictions about the impact of firms that choose to intemationalize on domestic firms.
To  study  the  effects  of  intemationalization  on  domestic  liquidity,  this  paper  uses
information on  3,253  domestic firms and  640 intemational  firms across  55 emerging market
countries during the years 1989 to 2000.  To measure liquidity, we use the turnover ratio, which
equals the value of a firm's transactions in a market divided by the market capitalization of the
firm in the domestic market.  We use transactions data because bid-ask spreads are unavailable
for our large panel of countries.
The paper  first  examines the  direct  impact  of intemationalization  on the  liquidity of
domestic firms.  Using annual, firm-level data, we regress the liquidity of domestic firms on the
share of intemational firms in the domestic market as well as country and year dummy variables.
While we cannot eliminate the possibility that an omitted factor is driving the results, we can
control for an array of firm-specific and country specific traits.  We do a variety of robustness
checks  controlling for firm-specific  characteristics (such  as finn  size,  sales, firm profits,  the
3  See, Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002), Coffee (1999), Lang, Lins, and Miller  (2002), Merton (1987), Portes
and Rey (1999), and Reese and Weisbach  (2001).  Also, Bailey, Karolyi,  and Salva (2002) find that eamings
releases impact the price and volume of intemational firms significantly more than domestics firms.
3firm's industry etc.) and various country-specific factors (e.g., trading of that country's  shar,zs  on
international  exchanges, economic development, legal  system efficiency,  international  capital
flow openness, inflation, etc.).  The results are consistent across numerous specifications.
The data indicate that as more firms become international, this  lowers the liquidity of
domestic  firms.  This result is robust  to controlling for  numerous  firm-specific and  coumtry-
specific traits.  These  initial results, however,  do  not shed light on  the mechanisms  through
which internationalization hurts the liquidity of domestic firms.
Next, the paper studies the channels through which international firms affect the liquidity
of domestic firms.  We study both the (1) migration and liquidity spillover channel and (2) the
domestic  trade  diversion  channel.  Thus, we  seek to  explain the  mechanisms through which
internationalization influences the liquidity of domestic firms.
To study the migration and liquidity spillover channel, we (a) assess whether the trading
of international firms migrates from domestic to international markets and (b) test whether the
domestic  trading of  international  firms influences  the  liquLidity  of  domestic  firms.  We, find
evidence of migration:  as the  fraction of international fimis  rises,  the trading of international
firms  shifts  from  domestic  markets  to  international  markets.  That  is,  as  more  firms
internationalize, domestic liquidity of international firms falls.  Furthermore, we find evidence of
liquidity spillovers.  The domestic trading of international shtares  is strongly, positively related to
the liquidity of domestic firms.  Thus, the data are consistent with migration and spillover view:
as the liquidity of international firms in the domestic market dries up because of migration, the
liquidity of domestic firms diminishes because of spillovers.
The migration  and  liquidity  spillover  channel,  however,  is  not  the  only  mechanism
through which internationalization hurts  the liquidity of domestic firms.  In particular, we find
4that internationalization is negatively associated with the liquidity of domestic firms even after
controlling for the migration and spillover channel.  Thus, we need to look beyond migration and
spillovers to understand fully the impact of internationalization on the domestic market.
Finally, we examine the domestic trade diversion channel.  The data suggest that as firms
internationalize, the domestic market intensifies its trading of those international shares, while
trading of firms that do not internationalize wanes.  This does not overturn the result mentioned
above: internationalization reduces the domestic liquidity of international shares.  This result is
consistent  with  theories  that  emphasize that  when  a  firm  internationalizes  this  enhances  its
reputation, transparency, and shareholder base in ways that make it more attractive relative to
domestic  firms.  In  sum,  domestic  trade  diversion  is  another  mechanism  through  which
internationalization reduces the liquidity firms that do not internationalize.
This paper's  assessment of the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic
firms is related to, though distinct from, a large  literature on  internationalization.  First,  some
research analyzes the impact of market integration on economic growth, investment, and asset
pricing.4 In this paper, we do not focus on financial integration broadly  defined.  Rather, we
examine the impact of the decision of one set of firms to cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or
raise capital abroad on the liquidity of the domestic firms that do not internationalize. 5 Second,
an extensive literature studies the effects of internationalization  on international firms.  Some
papers examine the volume and liquidity of international firms in local markets after firms cross-
list or issue depositary receipts. 6 Other researchers study the impact of intemationalization  on
4  See Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 2000), Bekaert, Harvey,  and Lundblad  (2001, 2002), Henry  (2000), Levine and
Zervos (1 998a,b), and Martin and Rey (2000).
5 Various  publications voice  concerns of markets  becotming illiquid (e.g., Bovespa,  1996; Financial  Times,  1998;
and Latin  Finance,  1999; The Economist,  2000; and the Federation des Bourses de Valeurs, 2000).
6 See Foerster  and Karolyi  (1998, 2000), Hargis (1998), Noronha,  Sarin, and Saudagaran  (1996), and Pulatkonak
and Sofianos (1999).
5stock prices, the cost of capital, and growth opportunities. 7 A related line of research analyzes
the effect of internationalization on asset size, growth, fnancing  constraints, and the financial
structure of firms that  issue depositary  receipts or cross-list.8  Although in the  course of our
research we assess the impact of the liquidity of international firms on the domestic liquidity of
those intemational fimns,  the focus of our researchl  is different.  We concentrate on examining the
impact of internationalization on the liquic[ity  of domestic firmns.
Only  two previous  studies  examine specifically  th.  effects  of intemationalization  on
domestic firms.  Moel (2001) finds a negative association between the fraction of a country's
stocks that issue American depositary receipts (ADRs) and domestic market liquidity.  Karolyi
(2003) also finds a negative link between ADRs and domestic market size and liquidity.
This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  on  internationalization  and  the  liquidity  of
domestic stocks in a number of ways.  First, this is the first paper to dissect the channels through
which  intemationalization  influences the  liquidity of domestic  stocks.  Thus,  we evaluate the
importance  of the  migration/spillover  channel and  the  trade  diversion  channel.  Second, in
examining the potential  channels through which  internationalization influences domestic stock
liquidity,  we  examine  the  impact  of  firms  that  internationalize  on  both  (a)  the  trading  of
international firms in the domestic market and (b) the liquidity of domestic firms.  Thus, besides
contributing to the recent  literature on the effects of internationalization on domestic firms, we
also  use  our new database  to  augment  the more established  literature  on  international  firms.
Third, we  substantially  expand  the sample size.  Our data cover  55 countries,  which  almost
doubles  the  number  of  countries  used  in  previous  studies  (e.g.,  Moel,  2001,  examines  28
7 See Alexander,  Eun,  and Janakiramanan  (1988), Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998),  Ernunza aned  Miller
(2000), Foerster and Karolyi (1993, 1999), Miller (1999) and Stulz (1999).
8  See Claessens,  Klingebiel,  and  Schtnukler  (2002a),  Pagano,  Roell,  and  Zechner  (2002),  and  Schmukler  and
Vesperoni (2001).
6countries  and  Karolyi,  2003,  studies  12).  Fourth,  we  extend  the  coverage  of  the
internationalization process by moving beyond the ADR market in New York.  Specifically, we
compile data on capital raisings that include global depositary receipts, cross-listings, and private
placements in other international markets.  Thus, we can more precisely classify companies as
international or domestic.  Fifth, we collect information on the international trading activities of
international firms.  That is, we do not simply examine whether a firm is listed abroad or not; we
incorporate time-vary trading data.  This has two advantages: (a) we control for country-specific
news  that influences global trading of that country's  shares and  (b) we assess how the time-
varying  extent  of internationalization impacts domestic  markets.  Sixth,  we  control for  firm
specific characteristics, including firm size and other traits,  to isolate  the marginal impact  of
intemationalization on firm liquidity while holding firm-specific factors constant.
Finally, we stress a limitation of this paper's  analyses.  We find that internationalization
reduces  the  liquidity  of  domestic  firms.  We  do  not,  however,  examine  the  net  effect  of
internationalization  (Hargis  and  Ramanlal,  1998).  Specifically, many  researchers  show that
internationalization benefits those firms that choose to  internationalize.  Furthermore, research
finds that domestic market liquidity is important for the cost of capital, firm performance, and
economic  growth. 9 Thus,  if internationalization helps international  firms and hurts  domestic
firms, a critical question emerges: what is the net effect for the domestic economy of firms that
cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or raise capital abroad?  We leave this for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the data.  Section III
presents the results.  Section V concludes.
9 See Amihud  and Mendelson (1986),  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (1998), Levine  and Zervos (1998a),  and
Beck and Levine (2003).
7II. Data
To assess the impact of internationalization on  domestic stocks, we need  the following
data:
1.  firm-level data on the international equity activities of firms, including
a.  dates of capital raisings, cross-listing, and depositary receipts,
b.  international  trading  data,
2.  firm-level data on domestic stock transactions,
3.  firm-level data on a range of firm altributes, and
4.  country-specific data on macroeconomic, institutional, and financial conditions.
An important contribution of this paper is that we collect considerably more data on the
international equity market activities of companies than past  studies.  The data for identifying
each firm's  international activities  come from two main  sources: the Bank  of New York  and
Euromoney.
Besides the Bank of New  York's  standard database  (the Complete Depositary  Receipt
Directory)  that contains informnation  on  current depositary  receipt  activities, the Bank of New
York gave us access to their historical databases and reports on  (i) depositary receipt program
initiation  dates, (ii) termination  dates (if any), (iii) capital raisings,  and (iv) trading activities.
These data form a comprehensive database on American ancl Global depositary receipt programs.
The historical data start in January 1956, but the vast majorilty of programs begin after 1980.
We  augment  the  information  on  dating  the  initiation  of  international  equity  market
activities with data from Euromoney.  They provide the dates when firms raise equity capital in
international capital markets, including cross-listings and issuance of global depositary receipts.
Thus,  the  Euromoney  data  substantively  enhances  our  ability  to  identify  firms  that
internationalize.  The Euromoney database covers 8,795 cross-border equity issuance and cross-
listing operations from 5,665 firms in 86 countries over the period January 1983 - April 2001.  In
terms of trading, we had access to data irom the London and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges  (LSE
8and FSE respectively) on the trading of depositary receipts and cross-listed firm.  However, LSE
trading data for these firms do not begin until  1997 and the data for the FSE do not start until
1999.  Thus, they cannot be usefully incorporated into our panel studies that trace the impact of
internationalization on the liquidity of domestic stocks and also assess  the dynamic effects of
trading in international markets on the domestic market.  Thus, consistent with existing studies,
we do not include LSE and FSE trading data.  This will underestimate the amount  of trading
abroad,  but this  is  unlikely to  bias  systematically  the results  in  a  particular  direction.  See
Claessens,  Klingebiel,  and  Schmukler  (2002b)  for  a  description  of  some  trends  on  the
internationalization of stock markets as well as their relation to country characteristics.
Consistent with our objective of assembling a broad database on internationalization, we
classify  firms as international  if they  (1) issue depositary  receipts,  (2)  cross-list, or (3) raise
capital through private placements  abroad.  The first  two clearly  involve  ongoing trading of
domestic  stocks in foreign countries.  However, raising capital through private placements  is
different  because  the  new  shares  are  not  necessarily  traded  abroad.  Thus,  the  issuing  of
depositary  receipts and cross-listing  may  involve the two potential  channels discussed  in the
Introduction: migration/spillovers and trade diversion.  Raising capital abroad in the absence of
cross-listing, however, will only potentially involve trade diversion in the domestic market since
simply raising capital abroad cannot induce migration.  As noted below, we confirm this paper's
findings with various sub-samples.
The  firm-level  domestic  stock  market  trading  data  are  from  the  Standard &  Poor's
Emerging  Markets  Data  Base  (EMDB),  which  was  formerly  collected  by  the  International
Finance Corporation.  In cross-checking with country sources, the EMDB is very accurate, but
for Argentina, we discovered that the EMDB information is inconsistent over time.  Thus, unlike
9previous  studies, we circumvent this problem by  collecting the  data directly from the Buenos
Aires  Stock  Exchange.  The  EMDB  provides  data  on  domestic  market  capitalization  and
domestic  value  traded  in  current  U.S.  dollars by  firm.  Although  the  EMBD  is  the  most
comprehensive database on firm-level trading of equities around the world, the EMDB focuses
mostly on emerging markets and does not include 1]00  percejnt of local firms (e.g., while varying
by country, the EMDB typically covers about 70 percent of market capitalization).
We also use balance sheet data on each faim to control for firm-specific characteristics
that may influence liquidity.  Thus, we control for industr)  effects, firm size effects, and firm
sales in  assessing the  impact  of internationalization on  the liquidity  of firms in the domestic
market.  For simplicity, in the results discussed below, we present the results controlling for firm
size, but the results are robust to controlling for the other fium-specific effects.  We obtain these
data from the Worldscope database (Thomson Financial Company).
The  firm-level  data  on  domestic  stock  market  trading,  the  firm-level  balance  sheet
information, and international equiity  activities are all matched at the firm level over the period
1989-2000. Appendix Table I lists the 55 countries in the s-tudy  and the number of domestic and
intemational firms per country, as well as surnmary statistics of the main variables under study.
In total, we have  over  18,000 firm-year observations.  Appendix Table  2 provides  additional
information  on data sources. 10
As a robustness check, we also control for country-specific infornation.  Data are from
the World Bank's World Development Indicators.  Data on the efficiency of each country's legal
system  are  obtained  from  the  Intemational  Country  Risk  Guide  (Political  Risk  Services).
Information  on  official  restrictions  on  intemational  capital  flows  is  from  the  International
°  Note,  that some countries in our sample do not have any international  frrms.  We keep these in the sample  as a
control  sample.  Importantly,  we confirm this paper's  results when we  eliminate countries with zero or only
one international firm.
10Monetary Fund's  Annual Report  on Exchange Arrangements  and  Exchange Restrictions.  In
additional  tests, we  control for  economic growth,  inflation, real  interest rates, terms of trade
changes, time  trend,  and  altemative  measures  of  capital account  openness that  we  describe
below.
Although our data have the limitations noted above, the database has several advantages
over previous work.  First, the data cover 55 countries, which - as we noted earlier - almost
double  the number  of countries used in previous  studies and increase the power of our tests.
Second, our dataset includes information on the intemational  equity market activities of firms
beyond  depositary  receipts  in  New  York.  We  collect  information  on  issuance  of  equity,
including cross-listing, in major financial markets.  Thus, we can much more accurately identify
which firms have intemationalized.  Third, we collect information  on the intemational  trading
activities  of each firm with  a  depositary receipt  program.  Thus,  in  assessing  the impact  of
intemationalization  on  domestic  market  liquidity,  we  move  beyond  considering  whether  a
company has intemationalized or not.  By incorporating time-vary trading data, we can assess the
dynamic effects of intemationalization.III. Methodology and Results
This  section empirically  examines the  impact  of  international  firms,  those  that  issue
depositary receipts, cross-list, or raise new capital abroad, on domestic firms, those that do naot
internationalize.  To do this, we first exarrine whether internationalization has a direct effect on
the  liquidity  of  domestic  firms?  Second,  we  examine  whether  internationalization  affects
domestic  liquidity  through  the  migration  and  spillover  channel.  Third,  we  test  whether
internationalization influences the liquidity of domestic firms through trade diversion.
A. Direct Effect
1.  Method
To examine whether intemationalization  is directly related to the liquidity  of domestic
equities,  we  estimate  the  following  regression  using  feasible  generalized  least  squares  with
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.
T7,c,  =  r1xISs,,  +  r2 xIT,,, +  M,,+A  x FJC,,  +5 xn, +52  X VI  +e  (1)
CiS  the turnover ratio of domestic fim  j in country c in year t, which equals the total
value of trades of firm j's  stock during year t divided by firm j's  market capitalization.'1 The
superscript D designates that it is a domestic firm during the entire  sample period,  i.e., it never
intemationalizes.  We define the dependent variable in this wvay  because we want to examine the
effects of  internationalization  on  the  firms that  rely  on  the  domestic  market  throughout  the
sample period.  By focusing  on those firms that never access international capital markets, we
test how their liquidity changes as other firms intemationalize.  In all regressions, we control for
t  Since in some cases the value traded  is zero,  we use the natural logarithm of one plus the turnover  ratio in the
regressions.  An altemnative  measure  of liquidity  is the number  of shares  traded  in one year  divided by the
number of shares outstanding.  This alternative abstracts from price changes.  But, it is impossible to usefully
aggregate across different stocks to obtain country-level liquidity measures using this alternative measure.
12country and time effects (n, and r,  respectively), but do not report these  in the tables to save
space.
IS,,  is the share of international fimns in country c at time t.  Thus,  IS,,  is the number
of international firms from country c at time t divided by the total number of firms listed in the
domestic  market  for  country  c  at  time  t.  In  computing  IS,,,  ,  a  firm  is  considered  an
intemational firm from the year it issues a depositary receipt, cross-lists, or raises capital abroad.
If, however, the  firm terminates its depositary receipt listing  or de-lists  from an international
exchange, then the numerator of  IS,,  falls by one.1 2
IT7', is the aggregate  turnover ratio of country c's  international  firms in international
equity markets  at time  t.  Thus, IT7', equals the aggregate  value traded  of all  of country c's
intemational  firms  in  international  markets  divided  by  the  market  capitalization  of  those
intemational firms.
We  include the variable  ITi'  because  we want  to control  for  trading of country  c's
equities on  international  exchanges.  Information  about  a  country's  political  and  economic
conditions  may  induce  trading  of  that  country's  stocks  in  both  intemational  and  domestic
markets.  This  effect  would  be  captured  by  a  positive  coefficient  on  IT7',.  To assess  the
independent impact of the share of firms in a country that are international on domestic liquidity,
we seek to abstract from time-varying country specific factors influencing trading.  Hence, we
include the trading of country c's stocks in intemational markets in regression (1).
Mc, is a matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific control variables.  We include
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita since the level of economic development may influence
12 Since firms can list abroad without listing in the domestic mnarkets,  this ratio could, in theory, be larger than one.
13financial markets development (Levine, 2003).  'We also inc  lude an index of the law and order
tradition  of  the economy  since the  operation  of  legal systems  may  influence  equity  market
development  (Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003; La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,
and  Vishny,  1998).  Furthermore,  we  corttrol for  the  openness  of  the  capital  account  to
international capital flows (using data from the International Monetary Fund) since international
financial integration may influence the liquidity of domestic equity markets  (Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad,  2001,  2002).  We incorporate the macroeconomic and  country-specific control
variables because we want to assess the independent impact of intemationalization  on domestic
liquidity.  Toward this  end, we  examined  a variety  of additional  country-specific  factors  in
robustness checks as discussed below.
Fj;,C  includes firm-specific characteristics in country c during year t.  We control for
company level traits to  assess the independent  irrmpact  of intemationalization  on the trading of
firms in the domestic market.  In the tables, we include the logarithm of the total assets in U.S.
dollars.  In robustness checks, we control for many other firn  characteristics.
2. Results on the direct effect
Contrary to a  variety of theoretical models  discussed  in the Introduction, the  Table  1
results  indicate that internationalization  Ls  negatively associated with the liquidity of domestic
firms.  In particular, the coefficient on the share of intemational  firms in country c at time t,  yl,
is negative and significant at the one-percent level across all of the specifications that control for
different combinations of regressors.  In terms of the other regressors, we  do not find a strong
link between  the trading  of intemational  firms  in  international  markets  and  the  liquidity  of
domestic  stocks.  Put  differently, trading  of country  c's  international  stocks on  international
exchanges  ( IT7')  is  not  robustly  related  with  the  liquicty  of domestic  stocks.  Also,  richcountries and countries with a strong law and order tradition tend to have domestic firms with
greater liquidity.  Finally, we see that the variable, total assets, enters with a negative coefficient.
The  reason  for  the  negative  coefficient  is  that  total  assets  is  closely  linked  with  market
capitalization,  which  is  the  denominator  of the  dependent  variable.  As we  will  see below
however,  when  we  compare  the  trading  of  stocks within  a  country,  the  equities  of bigger
companies trade  more than  those of smaller companies.  In sum, as the share of international
firms in an economy rises - i.e., as the fraction of firms in an economy that issue depositary
receipts, cross-list, or raise capital abroad rises, the liquidity of remaining firms falls.
The adverse impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic firms is not only
statistically significant; it is economically relevant.  For instance,  consider the  last regression
coefficient  based  on the  regression with  all of the regressors  included  (-2.2).  This estimate
implies that a two-standard deviation  increase in the share of international firms (0.086) will
cause the liquidity of domestic  firms to fall by -0.19.  This is substantial given that the mean
value of the liquidity of domestic firms (TjDC)  iS  0.50.'1
Some caution, however, is needed in interpreting these initial results.  Some may argue
that the results simply reflect the possibility  that firms that internationalize are good firms and
firms that do not internationalize are comparatively poor.  While potentially true, this would not
negate the value of the Table 1 results.  First, some theories discussed in the Introduction suggest
that internationalization boosts domestic liquidity by making markets more integrated.  We find
no evidence for this.  Second, we confirm the Table  1 results when controlling for many firm-
specific traits (as discussed below).  Thus,  even when controlling for firm quality, we get the
same result.  Third, the argument that bad firms remain domestic does not necessarily predict
13  Of course,  this type of experiment  is only for illustrative purposes.  Two  standard deviations  is not a marginal
change and we do not specify what drives the change in internationalization.
15that trading in those firms will diminish as good firms become international, which is what we
find in Table  1.  Fourth, we obtain the same results even whern  we restrict the sample to firms
that trade for the entire sample period.  Thus, uncompetitive finrms  that lose liquidity and drop out
of the sample do not drive the results.  Fifth, as we show below, the results  indicate that the
liquidity of intemational  firms in the domestic market falls with internationalization, which is
inconsistent with  a simple  story  that international firm  liquidity thrives  while  domestic  firm
liquidity falls.  An additional  weakness with the  results  thus  far is  that we  do  not provide
information on the mechanisms linking internationaliz.ation to dDmestic firm liquidity.  Although
regression (1) provides information on the direct impact of interaationalization  on the liquidity of
domestic  firms,  it  does  not  provide  information  on  the  channels  through  which
intemationalization affects the liquidity of doimestic  firms.  We turn to this now.
B. Miaration and Liquidity Spillover Channel
The migration and  liquidity spillover view predicts  a two-stage  channel through which
internationalization may  influence  the liquidity of domestic  stocks.  First,  internationalization
may  reduce  the  domestic  trading of international  firms  as the  trading  of intemational  finns
migrates to more  liquid, lower  cost international markets.  Second, the reduction in trading of
international firms in domestic markets because of migration may hurt the liquidity of domestic
firms because of liquidity spillovers.  Taken together, migration and liquidity spillovers provide
a theory of how internationalization might reduce the liquidity of domestic firms.  As discussed
in the Introduction, theoretical  debate exists on each of these two mechanisms that  define the
migration and spillover channel.  We assess empirically each of-these channels.
161.  The migration  part of the migration  and liquidity  spillover  channel
To examine the migration component of the migration and liquidity spillover channel we
use three different regression specifications.  Consider first the simple specification that assesses
the impact of internationalization on the domestic liquidity of international firms.
T  = Y 1 xISC, +2xIxT,, +'MC  xF  +AxFx,C,  x  +5 xnC + 32 X  +  Ct.  (2)
T'  t  is the turnover ratio of international firm j in country c in year t.  The superscript I
designates  that  it is an international firn,  which is a  firm that has  either  issued a depositary
receipt, cross-listed, or raised capital abroad at some point in the sample.  Thus, the definition of
an  international  firm  in  equation  (2)  is  consistent  with  the  definition  of  domestic  firms  in
equation  (1).  In  these  first  analyses, we  simply  split  the  sample between  firms that never
internationalize and firms that become international at some point in the sample.  Below, we will
assess the impact of an individual firm's  decision to internationalize on its liquidity within the
domestic market.
ITj§V is the aggregate turnover ratio of country c's  intemational  firms in international
equity markets at time t, excluding the trading of company j.  The other variables are the same as
those  in equation  (1).
Table 2 provides strong evidence that internationalization exerts a negative impact on the
domestic liquidity of international firms.  The coefficient on  IS,,  always enters significantly
and negatively.  As in Table  1, we control for the international trading of international firms
(IT  ,).  We do this to control for other factors influencing the trading of that country's  equities.
ITV  enters  positively, though  in  some  specifications  only  at  the  ten-percent  level,  which
indicates a positive link between the trading of a country's  stocks abroad and the trading of those
17international firms in the local market.  In suin, after controlling for many factors, we find that as
a  country's  firms  internationalize  this  negatively  influences  the  domestic  liquidity  of
international firms.
The second regression we use to examine the migration component of the migration and
liquidity spillover channel controls for the domestic liquidity of international firms in addition to
the international liquidity of intemational  firrns.  Thu,s,  to assess the independent impact of the
share of international  firms in a  country on  the dornestic liquidity  of individual  international
firms we now control for the aggregate liquiclity of international firms in both international and
domestic markets.
Specifically, we estimate equation (3).
T1
1 , =y,xIS,,  +y 2 xITV,  i  +  XTJ! +±>'MCz  +  >(Fj,  +S  x C +S2 ,  x  +E,j,.  (3)
TI  _  _  __JC,  'I  A
eCt,  is the aggregate domestic tumover  ratio of international firms, respectively,  excluding the
trading of company j.
Table  3 shows that  internationalization  lowers  the  domestic  liquidity  of international
firms, i.e., there is a negative and significant coefficient on  ISC,  . Thus, even when controlling
for many factors, the domestic liquidity of international firms falls as the share of firms in the
economy with intemational equity market operations rises.
The  Table  3  results  also  provide  some  preliminary  evidence  on  spillovers.  The
coefficient on TV  enters positively and significantly.  Thus, aggregate trading of international
firms in the local market positively influences the trading of individual intemational  firms in the
local market.  We examine liquidity spillovers in greater depth below.
18The third regression we employ to test for migration examines the relative trading of an
international firm in international and domestic markets.  Thus, we examine whether the fraction
of trading of an international firm shifts from domestic to international markets  as more firms
internationalize.  So far, we have examined the impact of internationalization on the level of the
domestic trading of intemational firms.  But the domestic liquidity of international firms can be
influenced by  several factors, including how attractive an international company is relative to
other companies.  Therefore, a more direct method for studying migration is to analyze the share
of the company's  liquidity in the domestic market relative to its total liquidity.
Thus, we estimate the following regression for international firms.
T' T' +It'=  Y,  xISc +  Y 2xITI, +  /3xTJI/,+  O'Mc,  +-t XAF,,  +  .i-  xnC  +  - 2xr, +  cj,,,  *  (4)
T.c  j,T!cS,  JC
The dependent variable in this equation measures the level of domestic liquidity of firm j relative
to firm j's  total liquidity, which includes the domestic liquidity of firm j  and the international
liquidity of firm j.  Since the market capitalization is the same in the numerator and denominator,
this measure is equivalent to using the ratio of value traded in the domestic market to total value
traded.  Importantly,  we control for the aggregate liquidity of country  c's  international firms,
excluding firm j (  ,'  ).  Thus, we control for the aggregate liquidity of firm j's  markets when
assessing the impact of intemationalization on whether the trading of firm j shifts abroad.
Table 4 presents regressions that are consistent with migration.  There is a negative and
significant coefficient  on  ISct  . This  indicates that internationalization  (an  increase  in the
proportion of intemational  firms in the domestic market) reduces the proportion  of trading of
international firms in domestic markets.  As above, we control for many factors, including the
19liquidity of country c's stocks (IT,  in international markets and also the domestic liquidity of
country  c's international  firms (Ti',  )
Table 4 also provides evidence consistent with tdhe  existence of liquidity spillovers.  Note
that TV ,  has a positive and significant coefficient.  A.lso, note that this holds while controllingy
for  the liquidity  of country  c's  international  stocks in  international  markets  (IT-I,,).  Thus,
proportion of trading of firm j that occurs in the domestic market is positively affected by the
aggregate liquidity of the domestic market (excluding firm j), i.e., aggregate liquidity influences
the liquidity of individual stocks.
2.  The liquidity  spillover  part of the m,igration  and liquiaity  spillover  channel
Next,  we  further  examine  liquidity  spillovers.  Does  aggregate  trading  in  a  market
influence  the  liquidity  of  individual  domestic  stocks?  If  there  is  migration  - if
intermationalization induces  a  shift  in  the  trading  of  internalional  firms  from  domestic  to
itnternational markets  - and  if  there  are  liquidity  spillovers,  then  this  represents  a  two-part
channel through which internationalization affects the liquidity oi domestic firms.
Besides  the  evidence on  liquidity discussed  above that  focuses  on  whether  aggregate
liquidity  influences  the  trading  of  international  firmns in  the  local  market,  we  estimate  an
extension of equation (1) that focuses on the liquidity of domestic:  firms.
T,  =r,xISC,+2xITc'  +  x T'  +S M,+A,xF>,,  +  xn  +52xr,+ ejc,. (5)
The difference  between  equation  (1)  and  equation  (5)  is thalt equation  (5)  controls  for  the
aggregate  liquidity of international firms in the domestic market.  Specifically,  Ti,  equals the
domestic turnover of international finns in country c at time t.
20Table 5 provides positive evidence of liquidity spillovers.  As shown, there is a positive
and  significant  coefficient  on  Tc,  in  all  of  the  specifications.  The  aggregate  liquidity  of
international  furms in  the  domestic  market  positively  influences  the  liquidity  of  individual
domestic  firms  above  and  beyond  (i)  the  aggregate  liquidity  of  international  firms  in
intemational markets ( IT', ), (ii) the degree of internationalization ( IS,,  ), (iii) macroeconomic
and country-specific controls ( Mc,  ), (iv) finr-specific  traits ( FJ,,  ), and (v) country and time
effects (n  and  ,  respectively).  Thus,  the  positive  coefficient  on  T.',  presents  evidence of
positive liquidity spillovers.
The  regression results presented  in  Tables 2-5  are  consistent  with the  migration  and
liquidity spillover channel.  We find that (a) internationalization reduces the domestic liquidity of
intemational firms and (b) the domestic liquidity of intemational  firms exerts a positive impact
on the liquidity of domestic firms.  Taken together, these results imply that internationalization
hurts the liquidity of domestic firms through the migration and liquidity spillover channel.
Note, however, that the migration and liquidity spillover channel is not the whole story.
In Table  5  when we  control  for the  liquidity  of international  firms in  the  domestic  market,
IS,,  still enters negatively and significantly.  Thus, the liquidity of domestic firms is negatively
influenced by  the  share of international  fimns in  a  market  beyond  the  aggregate  trading  of
intemational firms in the domestic economy (T',')  and in international markets ( IT2',,)  and after
controlling for country-specific and finn-specific  factors.  If migration  and liquidity spillovers
were  the  only channel  through which  internationalization  affected  the  liquidity  of  domestic
stocks, then  IS,,  should enter insignificantly after controlling for the liquidity spillover channel.
21The fact that  IS,,  remains significant suggests that internationalization is influencing domestic
liquidity through an additional mechanism.
C. The Trade Diversion Channel
1.  Method
Trade diversion is an additional channel through which internationalization can influence
domestic stock liquidity.  We assess whether intemationalization induces a compositional shift in
the domestic market from the trading of domestic stocks to the trading of international stocks.
More  specifically,  does the proportion  of r,he overall liquidity  of  the domestic  stock market
accounted for by a particular firm rise simply because it becomes an international firm?
To study the trade diversion channel, we estimate the following equation:
Sjc, =,AxIj,+02xIT!  +O'Mt  +cxMCapj,,,+ 1 xFj,,+d,xn,+,52x-,+Ej,.  (6)
=  is firm j's  share of tumover in country c in year t relative to the total turnover of
Tc,tI
country c's domestic stock market in year t, where total turnover includes the domestic trading of
both domestic and intemational  firms.  We also used value traded instead of the turnover ratio
and obtained similar results.
Ijc,  is  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  if  the  company  is  international  and  zero
otherwise. Note, that this dummy tums from zero to one when a firm intemationalizes.
IT,  is the intemational trading of companyj  and equals zero for domestic firms.
22MCap,,c  is the market capitalization of firm j.  We include this variable to control for
the fact that the share of turnover in firm j might tend to rise when the price of the stock rises or
when the number of shares outstanding increase. 14
Finally,  we  continue to  control for  the trading  of  international  fimns in  international
markets.  We do this to control for as many firm- and country-specific factors as possible and
focus  on  the  marginal impact  of  intemationalization  of the  proportion  of  domestic liquidity
accounted for by intemational firms.  We control for firm-specific factors, macroeconomic traits,
year dummies, and country dummies.
2.  Results on the trade diversion channel
The Table 6 results indicate that internationalization reduces the proportion of liquidity of
domestic firms in the local market through the trade diversion channel.  The coefficient, 01, on
I>,, enters with a positive coefficient in all of the Table 6 specifications.  Thus, the proportion of
the overall liquidity of the domestic stock market accounted for by a particular finn rises simply
because it becomes intemational.  Furthermore, note that the size of a company (total assets) is
positively associated with the share of liquidity of that company in the local market.  In sum, the
results are consistent with the view that internationalization induces a compositional shift in the
local  market  toward  comparatively  less  trading  of  domestic  stock  and  greater  liquidity  of
intemational stocks.
As noted in the Introduction, alternative theories predict trade  intensification, not trade
diversion.  These altemative views hold that internationalization will induce more active trading
of domestic stocks, not less.  In contrast, our results support the view that intemationalization
14 In the previous specifications, we do not include market capitalization  among the independent variables because
the dependent variables are already scaled by market capitalization.
23induces trade diversion.  As firms internationalize, the domestic market becomes more focused
on trading those international companies.
D. Robustness Issues
First,  there may be concerns that the entry and exit of domestic  and international  firms
will affect the results.  Thus, estimated all regressions holding constant the number  of firms in
the sample.  We obtained the same results with the control sample.
Second,  we  incorporated  additional  macroeconormic  and  country-specific  control
variables to evaluate the independent impact of internationalization on domestic  liquidity.  For
instance, we  included  the inflation rate since  inflation may  interfere with trading  and  reduce
market  liquidity (Boyd, Levine,  and Smith,  2001).  We also controlled  for  economic  grow:h
since business-cycle phenomenon may influence market activity.  We examined terms of trade
changes  since  shocks  may  importantly  influence  equity  market  transactions.  In  other
specifications,  we  included  the  real  interest  rate,  a  broad  i:ldex  of  financial  liberalization
developed by Kaminsky  and Schmukler  (2002), and  a time trend.  Including these  additional
macroeconomic controls did not change the r esults on the impact of intemationalization  on the
liquidity of domestic firms.
Third,  we  included  an  assortment  of  microeconomic  regressors  to  control  for  firm-
specific and industry-specific  factors influencing stock liquidity.  This is important  since firm-
specific traits may lead high-performing firms to internationalize and poorly performing firms to
remain domestic. Thus, we included industry dummy variables and information on firm sales and
profits.  Controlling  for these  additional  mi  croeconomic factors  did not  change the  findings.
Moreover,  even  when  including  array  of  firm-specific  variables,  macroeconomic  controls,
24industry  dummy  variables,  year  dummies,  and  country  dummy  variables,  we  continued to
confirm the papers  findings.  While  we are unable to rule out the possibility  that some third
factor is driving the results, the findings remained robust to many controls.
Fourth, to measure spillover effects in a different way, wz  estimated equations (3), (4),
and  (5)  including  the aggregate  domestic  liquidity of both  domestic  and  intemational  firms,
instead of the liquidity of only intemational firms.  We confirmed this paper's  conclusions.
Fifth,  our measure  of intemationalization  is based  on  the  number  of firms becoming
intemational.  It may be appropriate to weight intemationalization by the size and activity of the
firm  that  is  cross-listing,  issuing  depositary  receipts,  or  raising  capital  abroad.  Thus,  we
computed an intemationalization  measure based  on the value  traded  of the  internationalizing
firm. We again confirmed this paper's  findings.
Sixth, we  re-defined  intemationalization  by  excluding the  cases in  which  firms raise
private capital in intemational markets and, at the same time, do not issue a depositary receipts or
cross-list.  These  cases  are  only  a  small  proportion  (less  than  10  percent)  of  the
intemationalization episodes.  Excluding them did not alter the results of the paper.
Seventh,  we  also  experimented  with  interaction  terms.  We  examined  whether
intemationalization  has  a different impact on  domestic firms depending  on their size or other
characteristics.  Thus,  we  assessed  whether  the  liquidity  of  big  firms  that  do  not
internationalization falls more or less than  smaller firms that do not internationalize.  We also
examined firm profitability, sales, etc.  We found no evidence of these interaction terms entering
significantly.
25Eighth, in our sample, 19 out of 55 countries have zero or only one intemational  firm.
Thus, we re-did the analyses eliminating all 19 of these countries.  We got the same results with
this altemative sample.
VI. Conclusions
This paper finds that the intemationalization of stock mar.kets has a negative effect on the
stock market  liquidity  of domestic  firms.  We studied  in  detail  how  this  effect  takes place.
Liquidity  migrates  to intemational  financial markets, having  negative  spillover effects on the
liquidity  of  domestic  firmns  in  domestic  markets.  Furthermore,  there  is  trade  diversion  in
domestic markets as trading shifts from domestic to intemational  stocks within the local market.
As  a  result,  we  were  able to  identify two  channels  through  which  intemationalization  hurts
domestic firms.
The findings in  this paper  have  opened  several  avenues  for  future research.  First,  a
theoretical model that more comprehensively specifies the mechanisms influencing the impact of
intemationalization  on domestic markets would substantively sharpen the interpretation of this
paper's  results  and  shape  future  empirical  work.  Second,  although  this  paper  finds  strong
evidence of liquidity  spillovers, we  do not identify the  source: of these  spillovers.  To better
understand the operation of financial markets, future research might usefully dissect the sources
of  liquidity  spillovers.  Third,  it  would  be  interesting  to  understand  the  net  effect  of
internationalization.  Some papers have  argued that internationalization  has positive  effects on
the firms that intemationalize.  This paper has shown that internationalization hurts the liquidity
of domestic  firms.  What  is the net effect for the economy?  What  is the  future for domestic
26markets and companies that are unable to internationalize?  We believe these questions represent
fruitful areas for future research.
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31Table  1: Effects  of Internationalization  on Domestic  Firms
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic firms. Using firm-level data from 55 countries, during the years 1989-2000,
and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports results of the following regression equation:
Tjc,, = Yl x Is,,,  + r2  x IT',  + O'  Mc,  + Al x Fjc,,  + 9, x n.  + o62  x r, + Ej C, . TPD,  iS the logarithm  of one plus the tumover ratio of domestic  firtn  j in country  c during
year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm's market capitalization.  ISc,, is the share of intemational
firms in country c at time t and is the measure of internationalization.  IT'  is the logarithm of one plus the aggregate turnover ratio of country c's international firms in C,1
international equity markets during year t.  M;, is a matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per
capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per capita), an index of the law and order tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness
(Capital Account Liberalization).  Fjc,,  is a vector of firmj  characteristics in country c during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm
as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  In the regression n, and  T', represent country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year
Dumnmies  respectively), but the results on these coefficients are not reported in the tables. T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Dependent Variable:
Log of One Plus the Turnover  Ratio  of Domestic  Firms
is  j  -0.942 *  -2.483 *  -2.422 *  -2.340 *  -2.362 *  -2.203 *
[4.349]  [6.714]  [6.413]  [6.1301  [6.323]  [5.622]
ITI  0.023  -0.048  -0.077  -0.005  .3
[0.513]  [0.866]  [1.346]  [0.087]  [0.908]  [0.792]
Log of GcP  ner  canita  0.123 ***  0.112 **
[2.642]  [2.397]
Law and Order  0.034 ***  0.025 **
[2.964]  [2.189]
Capital  Account  0.032  -0.034
Liberalization  [1.521]  [1.558]
Log  of Total Assets  -0.062  ***  -0.063  ***  -0.062  ***  -0.058  *  -0.059  *
[8.891]  [8.921]  [8.940]  [8.243]  [8.310]
Country  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Number  of Firms  2,531  1,290  1,290  1,290  1,276  1,276
Number of Observations  14,382  6,735  6,735  6,735  6,556  6,556
R-squared  0.629  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.654  0.655Table 2: Effects  of Internationalization  on International  Firms
Thi;  table  rceorta  iegiessioiit  uf  ihe  impact  of  internationaiization  on  the  liquidlity ot  international firmns within  the  domestic  market.  Using  firm-level  data  from  55
Countries,  during  the  years  1989-2000,  and  cmploying  a feasible  generalized  least  squares  estimator  with  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors,  the  table  reports
results of the following regression equation:  TjI!  =ri xIS,,  + y2xITJI,  +O'M^, +4  xFj],  +  tY xn,+J  Xr,  +  cj 1 1 . TC!  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover
ratio  of international  firnm  j  in country  c during  year  t, where  the  tumover  ratio  equals  the value  traded  of firm j  in  country  c during  year  t  divided  by  that  firm's  market
capitalization.  IS,,,  is  the  share  of  intemational  firms  in country  c at time  t and  is  the measure  of intcrnationalization.  IT!  is the  logarithm  of  one plus  the  aggregate
turnover  ratio  of country  c's  intemational  firms  in  international  equity  markets  during  year  t, excluding  the  trading  of company  j.  Mc., is a matrix  of macroeconomic  and
country-specific  control  variables,  which  in the table  includes  the  logarithm  of real per  capita  gross  domestic  product  (Log of GDP  per  capita),  an index  of the  law and order
tradition  of the country  (Law  and Order),  and an index  of capital  account  openness  (Capital  Account  Liberalization).  Fjc,,  is a vector  offirmj  characteristics  in country  c
during  year  t,  which  in  the  table  includes  the  logarithm  of  total  assets  of  the  firm  as  a proxy  for  firm  size  (Log  of Total  Assets).  In the  regression  n, and - represent
country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these coefficients are not reported in the tables.
T-statistics are in brackets. *  *  * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Dependent Variable:
Log of One Plus  the Turnover  Ratio  of International  Firms is  -1.187  **-1.319 **-1.388 **-1.152 **-1.377 **-1.345**
[4.776]  [3.774]  [3.905]  [3.344]  [3.971]  [3.899]
IT!  0.137  **  0.113  *  0.119 *  0.155  **  0.111  *  0.171  *
J. ¢,  t  [1.997]  [1.778]  [1.839]  [2.393]  [1.736]  (2.586]
Log of GDP per capita  -0.038  -0.084
[0.716]  [1.557]
Law and Order  0.047 ***  0.053 *
[3.395]  [3.610]
Capital  Account  0.007  0.013
Liberalization  [0.249]  [0.440]
Log of Total Assets  -0.012 *  -0.012  -0.013 *  -0.012 *  -0.012 *
[1.653]  [1.570]  [1.822]  [1.663]  [1.685]
Country  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Number  of Firms  634  548  548  548  548  548
Number of Observations  3,863  2,945  2,945  2,945  2,910  2,910
R-squared  0.643  0.658  0.658  0.659  0.654  0.656Table  3: Effects  of Internationalization  on International  Firms - Beyond  Spillovers
This table reports regressions of the impact of internationalization on  the lquidity  of interaional  firms within the domestic market.  Using  firm-level data from 55
countries, during the years 1989-2000, and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports
results of the following regression equation:  T  =  x IS',  +  Y2  x IT;c,  +f6 XT!F  C ++  AIx nc +  62 x X,  +  T  C  ,,  is the logarithm of one plus
the turnover ratio of international firm j in country c during year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j in country c during year t divided by that firm's
market capitalization.  ISc,  is the share of international firms in country c at time t and is the measure of internationalization.  IT'  is the logarithm of one plus the
aggregate  turnover  ratio  of country  c's  international  firms  in international  equity  markets  during  year  t,  excluding  the  trading  of company  j.  Tjl,  is the  logarithm  of one
plus  the  turnover  ratio  of  international  firms  within  the  domestic  market,  excluding  the  trading  of  company  j.  Mc,  is  a matrix  of  macroeconomic  and  country-specific
control  variables,  which  in  the table  includes  the logarithm  of real per  capita  gross  domestic  product  (Log  of GDP per  capita),  an index  of the  law and order  tradition  of the
country  (Law  and Order),  and  an index  of capital  account  openness  (Capital  Account  Liberalization).  F' c,,  is a vector  of firm j  characteristics  in  country  c during  year  t,
which  in  the table includes  the  logarithm  of total  assets  of the firm as a proxy  for firm  size  (Log of Total  Assets).  In the regression  nc and r, represent  country-specific  and
year-specific  dummy  variables  (Country  Dunimies  and  Year  Dummies  respectively),  but  the  results  on  these  coefficients  are not  reported  in the  tables.  T-statistics  are in
brackets.  *  *  *  mean  significant  at 1%, 5%,  and 10%.
Dependent Variable:
Log of One Plus the Turnover  Ratio  of International  Firms
iSC,  -0.796 ***  -0.849  **  -0.845 *  0.744  **  -0.885 **  -0.834  **
[3.256]  [2.449]  [2.459]  [2.162]  [2.560]  [2.448]
IT!'  0.025  0.006  0.006  0.037  0.001  0.037
[0.4021  [0.l91  9r0.  112]  n[.664]  1  [0013].643
T  '  0.498  ***  0.445  **  0.445  ***  0.437  ***  0.443  ***  0.432  ***
J. c. *  [10.973]  [8.914]  [8.990]  [8.768]  [8.745]  [8.641]
Lug uf GD  per capita  0.002  -0.027
[0.044]  (0.5463
Law  and  Order  0.032  **  0.032  **
[2.363]  [2.301]
Capital Account  0.009  0.010
Liberalization  [0.341]  [0.376]
Log  of Total  Assets  -0.011  -0.011  -0.012  *  -0.011  -0.012
[1.548]  [1.526]  [1.664]  [1.559]  [1.601]
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Y.2s  Yes  Yes
Number  of Firnms  634  548  548  548  548  548
Number of Observations  3,863  2,945  2,945  2,945  2,910  2,910
R-squared  0.663  0.675  |  0.675  0.675  0.67  J  0.671Table 4: Effects  of Internationalization  on Migration
This  table  reports  regressions  of the impact  of intemationalization  on the relative  liquiditv  of  intermational  firns  in domestic  versus  international  markets.  Using  firm-level
data  from  55  countries,  during  the  years  1989-2000,  and  employing  a feasible  generalized  least  squares  estimator  with  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors,  the
table reports  results  of the following  regression  equation: T,!  I(T!  + IT!,>) = y  x IS,,  + y2 X  IT!,  +  xTl  C,,  +  '  M,,t +Z  xFj,,,, +  xn+6 2xr,  Ej,.  The
dependent  variable  measures  the  level  of  domestic  turnover  of  firm  j  relative  to  firm j's  total  turnover,  which  includes  domestic  turnover  and  turnover  in  international
markets.  Specifically, T,,  is the logarithm of one plus the tumover ratio in the domestic market of international firm j in country c during year t, where the turnover ratio
C, I
equals  the value  traded  of firm j  in country  c during  year t divided  by  that  firm's  market  capitalization  and where  IT],,,  equals  the  logarithm  of one plus  the turnover  ratio
in intemational markets of firm j from country c during year t.  ISc  is the share of intemational firms in country c at time t and is the measure of intemationalization.
IT!  is the logarithm of one plus the aggregate tumover ratio of country c's intemational firms in international equity markets during year t, excluding the trading of
company  j.  TJi,  is  the logarithm  of  one plus  the tumover  ratio  of  international  firms  within  the domnestic market,  excluding  the trading  of company  j.  Me,  is a matrix  of
macroeconomic  and country-specific  control  variables,  which  in the  table includes  the  logarithm  of real per  capita  gross  domestic  product  (Log of GDP  per capita),  an index
of  the law  and  order  tradition  of  the  country  (Law  and Order),  and  an index  of capital  account  openness  (Capital  Account  Liberalization).  Fj  C,  is  a vector  of firm  j
characteristics  in country  c during  year t, which  in the  table includes  the logarithm  of total  assets  of the finm as a proxy  for firm  size (Log  of Total  Assets).  In the regression
n,  and T, represent  country-specific  and year-specific  dummy  variables  (Country  Dummies  and  Year  Dummies  respectively),  but  the  results  on  these  coefficients  are not
reported  in the tables.  T-statistics  are  in brackets.  ***,  *  * mean  significant  at 1%, 5%,  and  10%.
Dependent  Variable:
Log of One Plus the Share of Value Traded  Domestically  of International  Firms
IS,.,  -0.807-***  -0.816  ***  -0.901  ***  -0.799  ***  -0.815  ***  -0.876
[7.186]  [5.914]  [6.168]  [5.957]  [5.888]  [6.136]
IT!  -0.108  ***  -0.120  ***  -0.114  ***  -0.116  ***  -0.115  ***  -0.099
X  .1  [3.407]  [3.253]  [3.097]  [2.988]  [3.101]  [2.540]
T l  0.068 ***  0.071 ***  0.068 ***  0.069 *  0.072 ***  0.066
[7.511]  [5.974]  [5.867]  [5.618]  [6.064]  [5.453]
Log of GDP per capita  -0.044 **  -0.048
[2.198]  [2.242]
Law  and Order  0.005  0.010
[1.101]  [2.066]
Capital  Account 
-0.023  *  -0.019
Liberalization 
[1.723]  [1.388]
Log  of Total  Assets  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001
[0.544]  [0.382]  [0.586]  [0.554]  [0.460]
Country  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Number  of Firms  621  535  535  535  535  535 Number  of Observations  3,628  2,768  2,768  2,768  2,733  2,733
R-squared  0.974  0.971  0.971  0.971  0.971  0.971Table 5: Effects of Internationalization  on Domestic Firms - Beyond Spillovers
This table reports regressions of the impact of intemationalization on the liquidity of domestic firms.  Using firm-level data from 55 countries, during the years 1989-2000,
and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, the table reports results of the following regression equation: TP=,x  IS,,, +;v.x  IT' +fi xT%  +  O'M,,,  +  A x F,,~,, 8  n +i2xr, +e  Tj  D
TJ'c,  = r,  t  lsc  + Y2  C'IT  +iT+'  +  XF,A  c+  T+  C!t  *,. TDC,,, is  the  logarithm  of one  plus  the  turnover  ratio  of  domestic  firm j in  country  c
during year t, where the turnover ratio equals the value traded of firm j  in country c during year t  divided by that firm's  market capitalization. IS,,  is the share of
intemational fimis in country c in year t and is the measure of internationalization. IT"  is the logarithm of one plus the aggregate turnover ratio of country c's international I  41
firms  in  intemational  equity  markets  during  year t.  TC  equals  the logarithm  of one plus  the domestic  turnover  of intemational  frmns in  country  c at during  year  t.  M,,  is  a
matrix of macroeconomic and country-specific control variables, which in the table includes the logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product (Log of GDP per
capita), an index of the law and order tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness (Capital Account Liberalization).  Fj C,  is a
vector of firm j characteristics in country c during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).
In the regression  n, and ra represent country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these
coefficients are not reported in the tables. T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Dependent Variable:
Log of One Plus the Turnover  Ratio of Domestic Firms
IS,,  -0.525  **  I  -1.269  *  -1.222  *""  I  -1.234  ***  -0.990  *  -0.927  **
[2.454]  [3.711]  [3.521]  L3.509]  [2.832]  [2.565]
-0.006  -0.095  *  -0.120  **  -0.078  -0.095  *  -0.123 **
[0  1501  [l808]  [2.2331  [1.554]  [1.804]  [2.443]
0.455 *  0.418  **  0.416 ***  0.412 *  0.430  *  0.429 *
[18.391]  [11.767]  [t l.703]  [11.653]  [11.833]  [11.966]
Lon  of  CMDP  ner capita  0.108  **  0.118  *
[2.408]  L2.6.2]
Law  and Order  0.013  -0.001
[1.090]  [0.055]
Capital  Account  -0.064  "*"  -0.068  *"*
Liberalization  [2.980]  [3.102]
Log of Total Assets  -0.063 ***  -0.064  *4'  -0.063 **"  -0.059  *  -0.060 *
[9.145]  [9.151]  [9.155]  [8.516]  [8.539]
Country  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Number  of Firms  2,531  1,290  1,290  1,290  1,276  1,276
Number  of Observations  14,382  6,735  6,735  6,735  6,556  6,556
R-squared  0.642  |  0.678  0.678  0.678  0.663  0.663Table  6: Effects  of Internationalization  on Domestic  Firms - Trade Diversion  Effects
This  table  reports  regressions  of the  impact  of intemationalization  on  the share  of firm's  liquidity  in the  domestic  market.  Using  firm-level  data  from  55 countries,  during
the years  1989-2000, and employing a feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard  errors, the table reports results  of the
following regression equation: Sj,,,, = ,  xIjC!  +  xITJ.  +'M,  + KxMCapj,  +A  xFjc  +1  Xn  +62 xr,  +j  . S;,c  = Tj,  /TTD+l is firm j's  share of turnover
in country  c in year  t relative  to  the  total  turnover  of country  c's  domestic  stock  market  in year  t,  where  total  turnover  includes  the domestic  trading  of both  domestic  and
international  firms.  Ij,  is  a dummy  variable  that  eqalals  one  if the  company  is  international  and  zero  otherwise.  This  dummy  tmrns from  zero  to  one  when  a  firm
internationalizes. IT! ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover of firm j from country c in international markets during year t.  MCapj c,  is the market capitalization of
firm j  in country  c during  year  t, where  the  turnover  ratio  equals  the value  traded  of firm j  in country  c during  year  t divided  by  that  firm's  market  capitalization.  Me,, is  a
matrix  of  macroeconomic  and  country-specific  control  variables,  which  in  the  table  includes  the  logarithm  of real  per  capita  gross  domestic  product  (Log  of  GDP  per
capita), an index of the law and order tradition of the country (Law and Order), and an index of capital account openness (Capital Account Liberalization). Fj c,  is a vector
of firmj  characteristics in country c during year t, which in the table includes the logarithm of total assets of the firm as a proxy for firm size (Log of Total Assets).  In the
regression n, and r, represent country-specific and year-specific dummy variables (Country Dummies and Year Dummies respectively), but the results on these coefficients
are not reported in the tables. T-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Dependent  Variable:
Log of One Plus the Share of Firm j Value Traded
,i.1  0.080 ***  0.079 ***  0.080 ***  0.079 ***  0.079 ***  0.080 *
[3.948]  [3.587]  [3.624]  [3.587]  [3.646]  [3.688]
IT'jc,  0.223  ***  0.091  0.094  0.091  0.087  0.089
[2.921]  [1.110]  [1.155]  [1.106]  [1.061]  [1.091]
MCap  J,,  -0.122 ***  -0.133 ***  -0.134 ***  -0.133 ***  -0.133 *  -0.134 *
[19.864]  [14.705]  [14.766]  [14.670]  [14.593]  [14.625]
Log ofGDP  per capita  0.134 ***  0.138  *
[3.062]  [3.102]
Law and Order  -0.001  -0.009
[0.098]  [0.699]
Capital Account  0.018  0.010
Liberalization  [0.680]  [0.371]
Log of Total  Assets  0.023  ***  0.023  ***  0.023  ***  0.025  ***  0.025  *
[2.765]  [2.689]  [2.752]  [2.916]  [2.842]
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Number of Firms  3,252  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,825  1,825
Number of Observations  18,488  9,744  9,744  9,744  9,526  9,526
R-squared  0.681  0.718  0.718  0.718  0.715  0.716Appendik  Table I (Continued)
Bask Statistics and Means
Log Tnrnover In  Log Ratlo of Value  Log Turnover In
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Log  Turnover  the  Domestlc  Traded  In the  Domeste  Log  Sbare  of  Internation  Catauzation Ceuntry  Flrm  lternational  Domestic  Sample  Period  (Domestie  Mnarke  Market  to Total  Value  International  Markets  C  tiflon
Frnms  Firm  Firms)  (Internatlonal  Traded  Firms  (International  (U.S.  dolla,
Firms)  (international  Firms)  Firms)
29  Mauritsu  17  0  17  1996- 2000  0.039  0.000  0.000  0.000  0 000  84.5
30  Mexico  101  42  59  1989- 2000  0 253  0.373  0.522  0 153  0.480  1,443  8
31  Morocco  21  2  19  1996  -2000  0.089  0.149  0.693  0010  0 000  488A
32  Namnbia  8  0  8  1999  - 2000  0.082  0.000  0 000  0 000  0.000  29.3
33  Nigeria  41  0  41  1989  -2000  0024  0.000  0.000  0000  0 000  66.0
34  Oman  34  0  34  1999  - 2000  0 152  0.000  0.000  0000  0.000  76 2
35  Pakistan  124  5  119  1989  -2000  0 210  1.030  0.693  0004  0 000  80 2
36  Peru  43  8  35  1992-2000  0.511  0.228  0.590  0015  0 151  230 1
37  Puibppmes  78  38  40  1989  - 2000  0424  0.324  0.685  0096  0 032  566 8
38  Poland  45  17  28  1992  - 2000  0.572  0.31I  0.693  0.038  0 000  395.7
39  Pomtugal  47  12  35  1989- 1999  0230  0.269  0.671  0039  0.034  669.9
40  Romania  53  2  51  1997  -2000  0 243  0037  0.693  0000  0.000  17.7
41  Russia  42  5  37  1996  -2000  0156  0.275  0.627  0 015  0.015  1,395.4
42  Saudi  Arabia  22  0  22  1997  -2000  0 305  0000  0.000  0 000  0.000  2,133.5
43  Slovak  Republic  20  2  18  1996  -2000  0 354  0 143  0.693  0 009  0.000  60.7
44  Slovenia  20  2  18  1996- 2000  0 332  0.324  0 693  0 030  0.000  104.7
45  South  Africa  102  33  69  1992  -2000  0 179  0.233  0 601  0.029  0.033  1,749.1
46  South  Kora  230  30  200  1989  -2000  1 196  0 891  0 683  0 014  0.042  809.7
47  Sn Lanka  66  2  64  1992  -2000  0125  0.216  0.693  0.004  0.000  26.2
48  Taiwan,  Pmvince  ofChina  143  30  113  1989  -2000  1.506  1.203  0.691  0 027  0.022  1,615.9
49  Thailand  125  31  94  1989  -2000  0 789  0602  0.693  0.048  0.000  633.8
50  Trinidad  and Tobago  12  0  12  1996  -2000  0047  0 000  0.000  0000  0.000  215.0
51  Tunisia  18  3  17  1996  -2000  0093  0 134  0.693  0 007  0.000  136 4
52  Turkey  78  16  62  1989  - 2000  1.019  0.659  0 691  0 026  0.002  632.8
53  Ukrame  19  0  19  1997  -2000  0 080  0 000  0000  0.000  0.000  80.2
54  Venezuela  23  6  17  1989  -2000  '0.190  0.222  0 570  0.037  0 302  328.1
55  Zimbabwe  34  3  31  1989  -2000  0 099  0.159  0.693  0020  0 000  64.4
_  Total  - 3,253  640  2,613  0 344  0 288  0 491  0023  0043  523 501Appendix Table 2
Series Description and Data Sources
This table shows the description of the data used and their coverage and sources,
Series  Description  Source
Variables  related to the  The datat come from Bank of New York (1989-2000) and Euromoney (1980-2000).  This information is  Bank of New York and Bturomoney
internationalization  of stock  used to classify firms as domestic or  intemational companies. Internaional  companies are the ones
markets  that issue a depositary receipt, cross-list, or raise capital in a foreign stock exchange at any time in the
sample. Different variables are consttucted  using this variable. See text for details.
Domestic market capitalization  Market capitalization  in domestic stock  markets.  Standard  & Poor's (former International  Finance Corporation) Emerging Markets
(current U.S. dollars)  Database
Domestic value traded  Value traded in domestic stock markets.  S'-d--rd  & Poor's (former lnte,m,tionn,  F,sn1  Cppnorntion)  Fmerging Markets
(current U.S. dollars)  Database
Value traded in foreign markets  Value traded in depositosy  receipts covering the period 1989-2000. Series are computed on a firm-  Bank of New York
(mmenret  U.S. dollars)  level basis by adding the different depositary  receipts that belong to each company on a yearly basis.
GDP per capita at market priies  GrOss  domestic product (GDP) divided by mid-year population.  The GDP at purchaser prices data is  World Bank: World Development  Indicators
(current U.S. dollars)  converted from domestic currencies using yearly official exchange rates.  For the eases in which the
official exchange rate is different from the market rate, the latter is used.
Law and order  Qualitative variable that ranges from I to 6, where  higher numbers indicate higher "levels"  of law and  PoGitical  Risk Services: International  Country Risk Ciwde
order.  Law and order are  assessed separately, with  each sub-component comprising zero to  three
points. The law sub-component  is an assessment  of  the strength  and impartiality  of the legal  system,
while the order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can
have a high rating in terms of its judicial system, for example  3, but a low rating, for example 1, if the
law is ignored for a political aim, e.g. widespread strikes involving illegal practices.  The data cover the
period 1984-2000 for all countries.
Capital account liberalization  Dummy that equals one on and after the year of capital account liberalization, and zero elsewhere. The  International  Monetary Fund: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements  and
(IMF)  data cover the puiiod 1975-2000  for all countrics.  Exchange Restrictions
Total assets  Total assets as  reported in  Worldscope for each firm-year, in million of  U.S. dollars.  The sample  Worldscope
covers the period 1989-2000  for al  I countries.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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